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ABSTRACT Although copy-move forgery is one of themost common fabrication techniques, blind detection
of such tampering in digital audio is mostly unexplored. Unlike active techniques, blind forgery detection
is challenging, because it does not embed a watermark or signature in an audio that is unknown in most
of the real-life scenarios. Therefore, forgery localization becomes more challenging, especially when using
blind methods. In this paper, we propose a novel method for blind detection and localization of copy-move
forgery. One of the most crucial steps in the proposed method is a voice activity detection (VAD) module
for investigating audio recordings to detect and localize the forgery. The VAD module is equally vital for
the development of the copy-move forgery database, wherein audio samples are generated by using the
recordings of various types of microphones. We employ a chaotic theory to copy and move the text in
generated forged recordings to ensure forgery localization at any place in a recording. The VAD module
is responsible for the extraction of words in a forged audio, and these words are analyzed by applying a
1-D local binary pattern operator. This operator provides the patterns of extracted words in the form of
histograms. The forged parts (copy and move text) have similar histograms. An accuracy of 96.59% is
achieved, and the proposed method is deemed robust against noise.
INDEX TERMS Digital multimedia forensics, audio forgery, authentication, blind detection, copy-move
forgery.
I. INTRODUCTION
Digital audio authentication/forensics is attracting growing
attention from information security researchers [1] because
of various reasons, such as ingenious and convenient forgery
techniques (e.g., insertion, copy-move, splicing), smart
editing tools (e.g., Audio Audition), unauthentic sources
(e.g., web and social networks), and a wide range of appli-
cations in different domains. For example, a pre-recorded
audio conversation can be forged for monetary gains, access
control, and as an alibi in the court of law [2]. One or more
parts of an audio message can be easily changed, mingled,
or may not belong to the original speaker. In such cases,
verification of audio integrity (i.e., authentication), as well
as forgery detection and localization (i.e., forensics), are
of paramount concern. Generally, it involves audio acqui-
sition, analysis, and evaluation to determine its originality
and possible manipulations. In the past, audio authentica-
tion was simple and convenient to investigate through spec-
trograms because they usually expose the irregularities and
abrupt changes due to tampering (e.g., environment, speaker,
contents), which can be observed from Fig. 1. However,
recent technological advancements and the availability of
advanced tools havemade the detection of any type of forgery
nearly impossible through hearing or visual analysis. Several
sophisticated tools for manipulation and tampering of record-
ing are widely available [3], [4] and can be easily employed
for audio fabrication without leaving a telltale. Therefore,
understanding the nature of audio forgery is crucial before
detection or localization.
Audio recordings can be fabricated by applying splicing
or copy-move because both types of forgeries are consid-
ered as the most dangerous manipulation methods for digital
media tampering [5]. In the former, two or more recordings
are used to generate forged audio; in the latter, some part
of an audio is copied and moved in the same recording
at different locations. Most of the existing forgery detec-
tion techniques can be categorized into active or passive
(blind). Active techniques rely on embedding and extracting a
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FIGURE 1. Spectrogram exposing abrupt changes due to insertion of an
audio segment of different environments [6].
watermark in the audio to determine its originality. The audio
is original if the embedded and the extracted watermarks are
the same, and forged otherwise [7]. However, a watermark in
most real-life scenarios is unknown; hence, such techniques
become impractical. By contrast, passive techniques [8], [9]
are considered more practical because they do not rely on any
signature or watermark. However, audio forgery detection
through blind techniques (i.e., passive) is a difficult task.
Moreover, localization of a tampered region in a forged audio
is more challenging compared to a binary decision (i.e., orig-
inal or forged). The main objective of this study is to present
a highly accurate passive copy-move forgery detection and
localization system for audio.
Unlike copy-move, most of the existing literature [8]–[11]
is geared towards splicing audio forgery detection. This is
mainly because it is relatively easier to identify recordings of
different environments, microphones, and speakers that were
used to generate a forged audio. For example, the authors
in [12] implemented MFCC and MPEG-7 based features
to recognize various environments. Similarly, a very first
approach to classifying microphones was presented in [13]
to determine audio authentication. Various approaches were
proposed for the classification of microphones and record-
ing devices to authenticate an audio in [14]–[17]. Splicing
forgery may also involve combining recordings of differ-
ent speakers. Various approaches [18]–[22] were presented
for speaker identification or recognition to cope with such
forgery. We limit our discussion to copy-move forgery after-
ward because this paper deals with the same problem.
To the best of our knowledge and literature review,
copy-move forgery detection either through active or pas-
sive techniques is still in its infancy, and a very limited
work has been conducted with regard to audio. For example,
Yan et al. [23] used pitch similarity to detect copy-move
forgery in an audio. A robust pitch tracking algorithm
YAAPT [24] was implemented to extract the pitch sequence
of all the words of an audio recording. The experiments
concluded that the pitch sequence of the original word and
its copy were exactly the same. Different similarity mea-
sures, such as Pearson correlation coefficient and average
difference, were computed to compare the pitch sequence.
To the best of our effort, we were unable to find any other
work that tackles the same problem.
In this paper, we present a novel method for blind detection
and localization of a copy-move forgery for digital audio
authentication and forensics. The proposedmethod employs a
sophisticated voice activity detection (VAD) module to deter-
mine the boundary points of each utteredword in an audio and
calculates corresponding histograms to observe the similarity
between the original and the audio in question. Histograms
are computed with the one-dimensional local binary pattern
operator. Histograms for the two words are exactly the same;
therefore, the proposed method can easily detect and locate
the original word and its copy located at a different place in
the audio. A copy-moved forged audio database is also cre-
ated in this study to evaluate the performance of the proposed
method. The database is generated in such a cultured way that
no human can judge a recording by hearing and visualization.
The location of copy-move forgery can be at any place in the
recording. Therefore, chaotically generated random numbers
are used to create the locations for copying and moving
the text in recordings. The forged samples are generated
by using the audios recorded in an office, cafeteria, and a
soundproof room to ensure that the proposed method can
work for different recording environments and devices. The
recording equipment, including sound cards and microphone,
varies for these environments. Microphones, also known as
sensors or acoustic to electric transducer, differ from each
other in polar patterns, which signifies the sensitivity of a
microphone to sound arriving from different directions to
its central axis. All audio samples of the generated forged
database are used to evaluate the performance of the proposed
method. In 96.59% of the audio samples, copy-move forgery
is perfectly detected. A detection error of 3.41% appeared due
to the inaccurate estimation of the boundary points.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2
describes the detailed process for generation of copy-move
forged database. The proposed system for the localization of
copy-move forgery in an audio recording is also explained in
the same section. Section 3 provides the experimental setup
and the results of the proposed method by using the generated
database. Section 4 shows the robustness of the proposed
method against the noise. The analysis and comparison with
the existing studies are also provided in Section 4. Finally,
Section 5 provides a few conclusions.
II. PROPOSED METHOD FOR BLIND DETECTION
OF COPY-MOVE FORGERY
In this section, the process to generate the copy-move forged
audio database and components of the proposed methods are
described.
A. GENERATION OF COPY-MOVE
FORGED AUDIO DATABASE
A copy-move forged speech database is developed to evaluate
the performance of the proposed method. Recording of vari-
ous environments and equipment are considered to generate
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the forged audio. The VAD module is implemented in such
a way that forged recording should not be judged by any
human being. The location of forgery could be at any place in
a recording; therefore, the locations for copying and moving
the text are generated through chaotic theory.
1) AUDIO RECORDINGS FOR COPY-MOVE
FORGED DATABASE
Audio recordings of King Saud University Arabic Speech
Database (KSUD) [25] are used to generate copy-move
forged database. The database is available through the
Linguistic Data Consortium, which is hosted by the Univer-
sity of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, USA. KSUD has diversity
in many aspects [26], [27]. Speakers of 29 nationalities from
Arab, African, and Indian subcontinents were recorded in
KSUD in three different sessions. In the first session, the
recording was conducted in three different environments:
soundproof room, office, and cafeteria. However, in the last
two Sessions, the cafeteria was not included to reduce the
recording time of a speaker. The recordings of the soundproof
room represent a quiet environment, whereas the record-
ings in the office contain some background noise. Moreover,
recordings in the cafeteria have people and background noise.
Every speaker recorded various texts, including digits, sen-
tences, paragraphs, and a question-and-answer session. The
text by every speaker in each environment and session was
recorded using diverse equipment, which differs from each
other in terms of microphone quality and sound cards.
To the best of our knowledge, KSUD is one of the most
comprehensive databases due to a variety of recording envi-
ronments, equipment, and speakers. The block diagram to
generate the copy-move database is depicted in Fig. 2. The
recordings of digits in all three environments are processed to
develop a copy-move forged database. For all environments,
there are many options of recording equipment. For the sake
of diversity, we consider the recordings of different sound
cards. Moreover, microphones used in the office and cafeteria
are similar; however, they are different from the soundproof
room. The selected environments with recording equipment
to produce the copy-move forged database are:
• In the soundproof room, a Shure (Beta 58A)microphone
is coupled with a Yamaha sound mixture (MW-12CX).
• In the office, a Sony (F-V220) microphone is linked
with an external sound card (Sound Blaster X-Fi
Surround 5.1 Pro).
• In the cafeteria, a Sony (F-V220) microphone is con-
nected with a built-in sound card of the desktop
(OptiPlex 760).
The sensors Shure Beta 58A and Sony F-220 have different
polar patterns. The pattern of sensor Shure Beta is super
cardioid, and this pattern is used for sound reinforcement in
conditions where noise is a major problem. By contrast, the
pattern for Sony F-V220 is omnidirectional and senses the
sound from all directions with equal gain, unlike the super
cardioid pattern that picks up sounds with high gain from the
front and sides but poorly from the rear.
2) VOICE ACTIVITY DETECTION MODULE
A voice detection module [28], [29] is one of the most
crucial components in the development of a copy-move
forged database because this module is responsible for the
accurate detection of boundary points of a text in an audio.
In a copy-move forged audio, a text from location i is copied
and moved to some location j. If boundary points are not
accurately determined, then a few parts of the copied text can
either be missed or may contain silence. When this inaccu-
rately copied text is moved to some other location, the audio
can be easily identified as forged. Therefore, we deliberated
and implemented the VAD module by considering various
measures, such as total amplitude, zero-crossing (ZC), and
duration of a text.
An audio is divided into successive non-overlapping
frames [A1, A2, A3, . . . , Ae, . . . , At] to calculate these mea-
sures. Each of these frames has a duration of 20 milliseconds
and k number of samples. The duration of frames is kept
small; hence, it can be easily ignored in the case of silence.
The total amplitude Te for a frame e is calculated by
using
Te =
k∑
s=1
|as|, (1)
where [a1, a2, a3, . . . , ak] are amplitudes in frame e. Total
amplitude of each frame is computed and used to differen-
tiate between voiced and unvoiced segments of an audio.
A threshold thresh provided by Eq. (2) is used to determine
the voiced frames. If total amplitude T of a frameAe is greater
than the thresh, then it is a voiced segment; otherwise, it is an
unvoiced segment.
thresh = 3% of [max (T )−min (T )]+min (T ) , (2)
where T = [T1, T2, T3, . . . , Tt], and max(T ) and min(T )
represent the maximum and minimum total amplitude in an
audio, respectively.
The second measure is ZC, which becomes very high in
the silence parts of an audio due to background noise. In the
implemented VADmodule, the ZC for silence segments of an
audio is made zero by subtracting a certain amplitude from an
audio. This amplitude is measured by using Eq. (2). By doing
so, the amplitude of the silence parts in an audio will become
negative; hence, zero ZC will exist. The last measure is the
duration of a text. The VAD module may split a text into two
segments, segX and SegY, because of a short pause inside the
text. The following condition is used to avoid this situation,
if [duration (SegX , SegY ) AND silence(SegX , SegY )]
< 0.3sec. then merge (SegX , SegY ). (3)
The duration of a digit and silence between consecu-
tive digits is approximately 0.5 and 0.4 seconds, respec-
tively. Therefore, if the duration of split segments and the
silence between them is less than 0.3 seconds, then they are
merged because they are part of the same digits as mentioned
in Eq. (3).
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FIGURE 2. The process for generation of copy-move forged database.
3) CHAOTIC THEORY AND COPY-MOVE OF TEXT
After detection of boundary points, the next important
step is to determine the locations to copy and move
the text to generate forged audio. The locations of copy
and move are determined by using chaotic theory. Unlike
randomness, chaotic behavior is deterministic, and the num-
bers generated through the chaotic system can be regen-
erated by using the same initial conditions. We have used
Gingerbreadman chaos theory [30] to determine the loca-
tions. The theory is defined by two-dimensional piecewise
linear transformation and is provided in Eqs. (4) and (5) as
follows:
xr+1 = 1− yr + |xr |, (4)
yr+1 = xr , (5)
where xo and yo are the initial conditions. In the generated
sequence y, every two consecutive numbers can be used to
determine the locations to copy and move the text. By using
these locations, any number of copy-move forged samples
can be generated from an original audio. For example, if a
recording contains 10 parts of a text and we want to generate
three forged samples from this text, then a sub-sequence yc of
y containing six numbers can be scaled between one and ten.
Every two consecutive numbers will describe the locations to
copy andmove the text for a forged sample. The sub-sequence
yc can be scaled in the range from u to v by using
Y = u+
⌊
(v− u)×
(
yc −min(yc)
max(yc)−min(yc)
)⌋
. (6)
When the location to copy and move the text is decided,
say i and j, the text is copied by using the boundary points of
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FIGURE 3. An overview of the proposed copy-move forgery detection system.
the text at location i. Now, the text at location j is removed
by using its boundary points, and the copied text is placed at
location j. Thus, a forged copy-move recording is generated.
B. THE PROPOSED METHOD TO DETECT
COPY-MOVE FORGERY
A method to detect copy-move forgery is proposed in this
study. The overview of the proposed system is presented in
Fig. 3. The first step to detect the forgery is the detection
of boundary points of the forged audio by implementing the
VAD module. During generation of forged audio, the text
at location j is removed and copied text from location i is
placed at location j. In such case, if the text at location i and j
have different durations, then the total duration of the forged
audio becomes different than the original audio. Therefore,
implementing the VAD module again is necessary to detect
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FIGURE 4. Computation of LBP codes.
the boundary points in a forged audio. Two major steps of the
proposed method are described in the following subsections.
These components include the calculation of histograms for
all words of a forged audio and their comparisons with each
other to determine the forgery location.
1) COMPUTATION OF HISTOGRAMS FOR ALL TEXTS
Consider an audio UCM from a developed copy-move forged
database. A histogram is computed for each word in the
audio to detect the location and contents of forgery, and the
local binary pattern (LBP) is implemented for this purpose.
The first step in LBP is a division of forged audio Ucm into
small windows such that each sample of UCM is a center of
a window. The length of each window is 2n + 1, where n
represents the number of neighbors on each side of a center
element. The center element of each window will be replaced
by an LBP code. In the case of N number of samples inUCM ,
the total numbers of windows are N − 2n when no zero
padding is done on either side of UCM . The windows of UCM
are provided by Eq. (7)
UCM =

u1 u2 · · · u2n+1
u2 u3 · · · u2n+2
...
...
. . .
...
uN−4n uN−4n+1 · · · uN−2n
. (7)
The center element un+1 of the window will be compared
with each of its neighbors on both sides to compute the LBP
code for a given window u1, u2, . . .., un+1, . . . , u2n+1 of
length 2n + 1. If neighbors are greater or equal to the center
element un+1, then they are replaced by a ‘‘1’’; otherwise,
the neighbors are replaced by a ‘‘0.’’ The process can be
implemented by using
Bi =
{
1 if ui ≥ un+1
0 Otherwise,
(8)
where ui’s are neighbors of the center element un+1 and I =
1, 2, 3, . . . , n, n+ 2, . . . , 2n+ 1. Bi is a row vector of length
2n containing the sequence of 0’s and 1’s. By considering the
left most element in Bi as the most significant bit and the right
most element as the least significant bit, the sequence in Bi is
converted to a decimal digit by using the relation in Eq. (9).
L = B1 × 22n−1 + B2 × 22n−2 + · · · + Bn × 2n
+Bn+2 × 2n−1 + · · · + B2n × 21 + B2n+1 (9)
B1 is multiplied by the highest power of 2, that is, 22n−1
because it is the most significant bit. The decimal digit L is
our required LBP code. The center element of the window is
replaced by the computed LBP code L. Similarly, the LBP
code for each window is computed, and the center elements
are replaced with their corresponding code. In this way, each
element of the forged audio UCM is substituted by an LBP
code. The range of LBP code depends on the number of
bits in vector B. In the case of 2n neighbors (n on each
side), the minimum code is 0 (when all 2n bits are zero)
and the maximum code is 22n−1 (when all 2n bits are one).
The numbers of bins of a histogram are according to the
number of LBP codes. Each bin represents the frequency of
the corresponding LBP code.
The entire computation process of the LBP code is
presented in Fig. 4. Suppose that the forged audio UCM is
provided by the following samples [0.7, 0.8, 0.5, 0.6, 0.1, 0.4,
0.7, 0.3, and 0.2]. The length of UCM is N = 9 and is divided
into windows of length 2n + 1 = 5, where the number of
neighbors on each side of the center elements is n = 2. The
total number of the window of length 5 isN−2n = 5 because
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no zero padding is conducted on either end of the audio. The
center element n + 1 = 3 is compared with each neighbor
in every window. In case of the first window [0.7, 0.8, 0.5,
0.6, 0.1], the 3rd element is the center element and is equal
to 0.5. The element 0.5 is compared with all of its neighbors
[0.7, 0.8, 0.6, 0.1]. The neighbors 0.7, 0.8, and 0.6 are greater
than the center element 0.5; therefore, they are replaced
by ‘‘1.’’ The neighbor 0.1 is smaller than the center element;
hence, it is substituted by ‘‘0.’’ Consequently, a row vector
B = [B1, B2, B4, B5] = [1 1 1 0] is obtained, which contains
a sequence of 0’s and 1’s of length 2n = 4. The left most
element B1 is the most significant bit. The most significant
bit B1 is multiplied with 22n−1=3 to convert the four-bit
binary number B into a decimal number. The remaining
bits B2, B4, and B5 are multiplied with 22n−2=2, 2n−1=1,
and 20, respectively. The sum of these terms provided an
LBP code. The binary number contains four bits; therefore,
the range for LBP code is from 0 (0000)2 to 24 − 1 =
15 (1111)2. In this scenario, the number of LBP codes
is 16; therefore, the histogram will contain 16 bins. Each
bin describes the frequency of the corresponding LBP code.
In other words, bin 10 represents the number of times LBP
code 10 is repeated.
2) DETECTION OF COPY-MOVE FORGERY
The numbers of bins in the histograms depend on the total
number of neighbors in a window. If the numbers of neigh-
bors are 2n, then the numbers of bins are 22n in a his-
togram. The size of histograms will be the same for all words
because the size of the window is constant for all words of a
forged audio. For the m number of words in a forged audio,
m number of histograms is computed (one for each word).
All histograms will be compared with each other to detect
the forgery location and the word that has been copied and
moved. A quality metric (QM) with two measures, mean
square error (MSE), and energy ratio (ENR) is used to make
comparisons between the histograms. MSE and ENR are
computed by using the relation provided in Eqs. (10) and (11),
respectively.
MSE =
22n∑
g=1
(
Hgi − Hgj
)2
22n
, (10)
ENR =
22n∑
g=1
(
Hgi
)2
22n∑
g=1
(
Hgj
)2 , (11)
where g stands for the number of bins in each histogram.
MSE determines the difference between two histograms by
computing the squared sum of differences of corresponding
bins in the two histograms Hi and Hj. The value of MSE
closer to zero will indicate that histogramsHi andHj are very
similar to each other. Meanwhile, the large values indicate
that the histograms are distinct. In case of copy-move forgery
when the same word is present at locations i and j, MSE
will provide a value equal to zero or very close to zero for
the histograms Hi and Hj. The small values of MSE show
that the words at locations i and j are the same. In this way,
the words at locations i and j are determined to be copies
of each other, and the audio under consideration is forged.
In addition, ENR computes the energy of the histograms Hi
and Hj by taking the sum of squared values of all bins and
providing a ratio between energies of Hi and Hj. The value of
ENR closer to 1 shows that the histograms Hi and Hj are the
same.
For them number of words, a matrixM of dimensionm×m
is obtained after comparing the histograms with each other.
The first row 1 × m of the matrix M contained the QM for
the histogram of the first word with all remaining m − 1
histograms. Similarly, the QM for the second word is listed
in the second row 2 × m of the matrix M. At the diagonal
of matrix M, all measures in QM will be zero. Diagonal
elements 1 × 1, 2 × 2, 3 × 3, . . . , m × m comprise values
that are obtained by comparing the histogram of a word with
itself. Therefore, we have to analyze the values of QM where
i and j are different, that is i 6= j, to detect the copy-move
forgery.
III. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS FOR FORGERY DETECTION
Ninety different speakers of various nationalities are ran-
domly taken from KSUD to generate copy-move forged
audios and evaluate the performance of the proposed detec-
tion system. Recordings of all environments (soundproof
room, office, and cafeteria) for each of the selected speaker
are considered. Therefore, the total number of original audio
recordings is 270 (= 90 × 3). These recordings contain
10 digits from zero to nine. The digits are considered because
of their potential application to authenticating the secret code
for remotely accessing the confidential data.
The sequence y to determine the locations are chaotically
created by using initial condition x0 = 12 and y0 = 9 in
Eqs. 4 and 5, respectively, to avoid human involvement in the
generation of forged audio. Any value can be selected as an
initial condition because we will scale this value later accord-
ing to the requirement. Five recordings from each original
audio with forgery at different locations are generated. For
this purpose, 10 locations are required for each recording,
one to determine the location to copy a digit and the other to
move the digit. Therefore, the sequence ywill contain at least
2700 (= 270 × 10) elements to generate 1350 forged audio
recordings. Each audio has 10 locations. Therefore, a sub-
sequence yc of sequence y containing 10 numbers is scaled
from one to ten using u = 1 and v = 10 in Eq. (6).
Each forged audio contains 10 digits, and a histogram for
each digit is computed by following the process described in
Section 2.2.1. The histograms are computed by considering
n = 2, n = 3, and n = 4, where n represents the number
of neighbors on each side of the center element in divided
windows. The range of LBP codes for n = 2, 3, and 4 will
be [0 15], [0 63], and [0 255], respectively. Therefore, the
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FIGURE 5. Computed histograms of digits from zero to nine in a copy-move forged audio for n = 2. Histogram Hist 1 is for digit 0,
Hist 2 for digit 1 and so on.
TABLE 1. MSE for a forged audio when digit one is copied and moved to the place of digit eight.
number of bins in the histograms will be 16, 64, and 256
for n = 2, 3, and 4, respectively. The calculated LBP codes
replace every sample of a digit, and these codes describe the
characteristics of a digit. The computed histograms for all
digits from zero to nine of a forged audio with n = 2 are
depicted in Fig. 5.
All histograms are comparedwith each other, andmeasures
in QM are calculated to detect the location of copy-move
forgery. After comparison, a matrixM of dimension 10× 10
is obtained. The calculated MSE for all histograms shown in
Fig. 5 are listed in Table 1. The values for MSE in the first
row are obtained by comparing the histogram of digit zero
with all the remaining histograms. Similarly, the second row
contains the MSE values of the histogram of digit one with
the rest of the histograms.
The decision of the forgery is made by determining
the index for the minimum value of MSE when i 6= j.
Table 1 shows that MSE is equal to zero at row 1 (R1) and
column 8 (C8) other than diagonal values, that is, i 6= j. This
finding suggests that the digit at R1 and C8 are the same,
with one of them as the original and the other one a copy.
Therefore, it can be concluded that the audio is tampered by
copy-move forgery, and the proposed system will highlight
the original digit and its copy, as shown in Fig. 6. The other
measure in QM, energy ratio, at R1 and C8, is equal to one.
This ratio shows that both histograms have the same energy,
which means that bins of both histograms are exactly equal,
that is, representing the identical digits.
In the case of different copy-move locations in an audio
recording, the MSE are presented in Tables 2 and 3. Table 2
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TABLE 2. MSE for a forged audio when digit two is copied and moved to the place of five.
TABLE 3. MSE for a forged audio when digit three is copied and moved at the place of six.
FIGURE 6. Original digit and its copy in a forged audio is highlighted by the proposed method.
provides the MSE values when the digit two is copied and
moved at the place of five, whereas Table 3 provides theMSE
values when the copy of digit three is moved at the place
of six.
The proposed system is used for the localization of copy-
move forgery in all generated forged recordings. All 1350
forged recordings are used to detect the copy-move forgery,
and an accuracy of 96.59% is obtained. Although the lan-
guage of the forged database is Arabic, the proposed system
will still work for any language.
IV. ROBUSTNESS AND ANALYSIS OF THE
PROPOSED METHOD
The proposed system should be able to detect the location of
a copy-move forgery even in a noise added forged recording.
The robustness of the system is tested by adding noise of
different signal-to-noise ratios (SNR).Moreover, the compar-
isons of the proposed system with the contemporary methods
are also presented in this section.
A. ROBUSTNESS AGAINST ATTACK OF NOISE
In case of copy-move forgery, an attacker can add random
noise in an audio to hide the tampering. The random noise
does not remain the same throughout the recording. This
noise will be different at different places in a recording.
Therefore, after adding the noise, the resultant forged audio
will be changed. Random noise of various SNRs is added
to the forged recordings to observe the robustness of the
proposed system and then copy-move forgery is detected.
In Fig. 7, a white Gaussian random noise of 30 dB is added
to a forged signal.
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FIGURE 7. (a) Forged audio (b) White Gaussian random noise (c) Forged audio after adding noise (forged audio attacked
with noise).
Detection of copy-move forgery may become apparent if
the blind addition of noise in an audio either makes the entire
signal suspicious or entirely distorts the signal. Therefore,
noise is sophisticatedly added in the forged audio. Thus, no
human can judge it by hearing. The power of the noise should
be in accordance with the power of forged audio. The power
of the forged audio FA is computed as follows:
pow (FA) = 1N
N∑
l=1
(FA)2. (12)
Noise of SNR= 50 dB is added to all forged recordings and is
increased by considering the SNR of 40 and 30 dB.Moreover,
SNR of 20 dB can be significantly heard in the forged audio;
therefore, SNR of 20 dB and below is not considered in the
study. The power of the audio is converted into dB by using
Eq. (13)
pow (FA) = 10× Log10 [pow (FA)] dB. (13)
The power of noise is obtained by
pow (Noise) = pow (FA)− SNR. (14)
The performance of the proposed system is evaluated on noise
added forged audio. The obtained accuracy of the system is
96.59%, which is similar to that of the forged audio without
noise. No change in the accuracy shows that the addition
of noise did not change the performance of the proposed
system. This finding concludes that the proposed system is
robust against noise and can detect copy-move forgery in case
of noise attacks. The random noise changes the amplitude
throughout the forged audio; therefore, the digit and its copy
are different. The difference between their histograms is not
exactly zero. However, the difference between histograms of
a digit and its copy will be minimum. The histogram with
a minimum distance determines the location of copy-move
forgery.
B. ANALYSIS AND COMPARISON
This study has two important parts: the first part is the devel-
opment of a copy-move forged audio database, and the second
part described the proposed method for forgery detection
and localization. Audio recordings of various speakers with
different ethnic groups are selected to generate the forged
database. For each speaker, the recording of three different
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FIGURE 8. (a) A copy-move forged generated audio. (b) Spectrogram of the forged audio. No obvious clues are present in the spectrogram to
detect the forgery.
environments and equipment is considered. By using these
audios, the copy-move forged recordings are generated in
such a way that an obvious trace exists to detect the forgery.
Fig. 8 (a) depicts a forged recording in which digit four is
copied and moved to the place of seven. The spectrogram of
that audio is shown in Fig. 8 (b), in which the spectrogram
shows that the generated forged sample does not have any
irregularities or abrupt changes. Therefore, no one can judge
by hearing and visualization that the audio is tampered.
The second part of the study presented a method for the
localization of the copy-move forgery in audio recordings.
The proposed method does not require watermark embedding
in the original audio to determine the forgery. The method
analyzes the contents of the audio to identify the copy-move
forgery. The forgery is detected by finding the similarity
between the words of audio recordings. The similar words
(original word and its copy) are determined by the QM,which
is obtained through the comparison of histograms. In the case
of duplicate digits (a digit and its copy), MSE and ENR in
QM will be close to zero and one, respectively. In addition,
if a digit is repeating in a forged sample then each instance
of the digit will have a different waveform [23]. However,
waveforms of the digits will only be same in the case of copy-
move forgery.
The accurate calculation of boundary points is one of the
crucial components of the proposed method. Although the
obtained accuracy is 96.59%, it can still be improved to 100%
if it can be assured that the boundary points are accurately
computed and that they do not contain any silence part. For
forgery localization, the tuning of the different parameters is
always essential [8], [9], [23]. For example, the authors of a
previous study [23] used a threshold on the two parameters
to make the decision regarding copy-move forgery, and the
results depended on the adjusted thresholds. Similarly, the
performance of the system for splicing forgery localization
in [8] is sensitive to the sampling frequencies and requires
tuning for different sampling frequencies.
Five different parameters are adjusted every time to tune
the system. In addition, this method is very sensitive to noise,
and the accuracy is decreased by 30% for noise added to
the recordings. By contrast, our proposed method does not
need any parameter adjustment. Moreover, the accuracy of
the proposed system is not affected by the noise. Unlike [8],
our proposed method is insensitive to sampling frequency
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FIGURE 9. Error in detection of boundary points causes problem in forgery detection.
because it does not transform the audio recording into a
frequency domain. The method proposed in [9] for splicing
forgery localization is sensitive to the length of the analysis
window. The accuracy of the method significantly varies
because of the length of the window. However, the perfor-
mance accuracy of our proposed method is not affected by
the length of the analysis window and remains consistent for
different windows, that is, n = 2, 3, and 4.
Nonetheless, in 3.41% of the forged recordings, copy-
move forgery is incorrectly detected by the proposed method.
These recordings are investigated, and boundary points are
incorrectly determined. When boundary points are inaccu-
rately calculated for the words in a recording, histograms of
even similar words (original and its copy) will differ from
one another. Therefore, detecting the copy-move forgery is
impossible. A forged audio in which digit three is copied and
moved to the place of six is shown in Fig. 9. In this forged
audio, boundary points are inaccurately calculated.
The portion indicated by an arrow in Fig. 9 is not part of
digit three. Therefore, the histograms are different, and MSE
between digit three and its copy is not zero. The computation
error of boundary points can be avoided if they could be man-
ually double-checked to confirm that the detected boundary
points do not contain silence.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have presented a new method for the detec-
tion and localization of copy-move forgery using the passive
approach. The proposed method performs blind detection of
forgery by inspecting the content of an audio recording. The
method detects the words through the VADmodule and com-
putes the histograms by LBP application. By comparing the
histograms, the method determines the similarity measures
to make the decision regarding the location of copy-move
forgery. An accuracy of 96.56% is obtained with the proposed
method. The method does not need any threshold to make
the decision, and no tuning of any parameter is required.
By adding the noise of different signal-to-noise ratios, the per-
formance of the system remains consistent. Moreover, attack-
ing noise to hide the tampering of an audio does not affect
the accuracy of the proposed method. During evaluation of
the proposed method, a detection error of 3.41% is observed
because of the inaccurate estimation of the boundary points.
This error can be reduced to a minimum level in the future by
improving the VAD module.
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